The Wagner Group's setback in Mali calls into query Moscow's strategy in Africa and the region's trust in Russian mercenaries

While the Russian army stuck in Ukrainehis mercenaries are Things aren’t any higher in Africa.

At the tip of July 2024, mercenaries of the the Wagner Group, a personal military company allied with Moscowaccompanied the Malian army in what the Malian regime called “Stabilization operation“ within the town of Tinzaouaten within the northeast of the West African country, near the Algerian border.

This mission quickly went sideways when fighting broke out between this coalition and rebels of the Permanent Strategic Framework, a separatist Tuareg group.

During the retreat, Wagner and the Malian forces were ambushed by fighters from the al-Qaeda offshoot. Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimor JNIM.

More than 80 Wagner people and over 40 Malian soldiers were Reportedly killed within the fightingAmong the victims were Nikita FedyaninWagner's popular Telegram channel The Grey Zone.

While Tuareg rebels And the kind and implementation celebrated their success quickly, Mali and Wagner tried to downplay their losses.

And that’s comprehensible. The defeat in Tinzaouaten puts each the Wagner Group and Russia in a dilemma. It signals to the African heads of state and government the boundaries of Moscow-backed mercenaries as partners within the fight against terrorism and regime protection, especially in a fancy security environment akin to Mali. But it also represents Moscow’s Strategy on the continent.

Since the Death of Wagner's leader Yevgeny PrigozhinIn August 2023, Moscow attempted to take over the group’s activities by Afrika Corpsa project controlled by the Ministry of Defense, modeled on the Wagner. This project goals to provide Wagner fighters directly under the leadership and control of the Russian state.

However, this proved tougher than Moscow expected and sophisticated Russia's plans to expand its partnerships across Africa by offering support to personal defense corporations.

Wagner's questionable reliability

The Tinzaouaten incident was a severe blow for Wagner and represented the most important known lack of life in Africa. For context: In the just about ten years of its existence Anti-terror mission based in Mali, the French lost 59 soldiersFrance’s approach to counterterrorism in Mali contributed to the spread of military discontent, which led to several coups between 2020 and 2021It also laid the inspiration for the coup plotters in Mali to show to Wagner quite than Paris for security issues.

Since the invasion of Mali in December 2021 – and particularly after the Death of Prigozhin – Wagner’s forces have had some successes. In November, Russian mercenaries helped the Malian army recapture town of Kidala separatist stronghold.

This success can have led to overconfidence; because the Tinzaouaten incident shows, there are very real security problems throughout Mali, and Wagner’s tactics, including indiscriminate violence and targeted attacks on civiliansare by far not probably the most effective instruments for coping with the safety crisis in Mali.

Although the Tinzaouten incident was the most important known loss for Wagner in Africa, it isn’t the primary. Already in 2019, the Wagner forces famously overpromised and underfulfilled in a short-lived anti-terrorism campaign in Mozambique.

In this case, Wagner lasted only a number of months before withdrawing after it became clear that the force was poorly equipped, inadequately prepared, and too hostile to local Mozambican military partners.

While recent events in Mali will not be comparable, Wagner's departure from Mozambique is more likely to weigh heavily on the minds of the leaders of the Malian junta following the group's latest setback.

There are many questions on whether Wagner or his successor, the Afrika Korps, will proceed to work on Mali's security.

There can be the potential for increasing tension between the Malian army and its Russian partners concerning the security mission and who’s in charge. In addition to Testing this relationship Now there may very well be friction and other problems in the long run.

Moscow's maneuvers

Russia has tried to allay concerns following the attack on Tinzaouaten. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov contacted his Malian counterpart to reaffirm Russia's commitment to the country.

But words are low cost. Whether the Kremlin plans to compensate for Wagner's losses by deploying additional personnel stays an open query. More importantly, the issues plaguing Mali can’t be solved by force of arms, and each the present regimes in Moscow and Mali have proven tired of nonmilitary solutions – akin to negotiations with non-state actors – to real or perceived security threats.

And Russia’s involvement in Mali is anything but altruistic. Mali is Africa’s fourth largest producer of gold. Like Wagner, Moscow wants a bit of this market. In November 2023, Russia will signed an agreement with Mali to construct the country's largest gold refinery.

On the surface, this may very well be an economic boost for Mali, however the timeline of the project is unclear. The plan also has neo-colonialist undertones, despite Russia's rhetoric contradicts.

However, there’s a scenario through which Wagner advantages from the recent setback. several Security experts As representatives of the African Sahel have noted, the losses may even improve Wagner's repute among the many Malian military leadership and the Malian people generally; the willingness to fight and die alongside partners sends a powerful signal.

In countries like Mali, which have long been wary of foreign intervention, Wagner's willingness to enter the fight and tackle tasks that France and its Western security partners were unwilling to undertake resonated with sections of the population.

Unforeseen consequences

The setback for Wagner in Mali could also profit Moscow in one other unexpected way.

A couple of days after the incident, a spokesman for Ukrainian military intelligence suggested that Ukraine can have played a job in providing information to Tuareg groups.

This message – whether feigned or true – led Mali to break off diplomatic relations with Ukraine. Neighbour Niger quickly followed this instance.

Ukraine has since vehemently denied Participation.

Nevertheless, this dynamic illustrates the impact of competition between Moscow and Kyiv.

Ukraine may benefit from Wagner's failures in Africa and force his clients to rethink the worth of their partnerships with Moscow. But as Mali's response shows, such efforts also can backfire.

Russia’s unbelievable denial

Nevertheless, Wagner's losses pose more challenges than opportunities for Russia.

Moscow may very well be on the Hook for Wagner’s failure in Africaespecially because it seeks to exchange Wagner with the Afrika Corps.

Events akin to people who occurred at the tip of July can now not simply be explained away by the Kremlin. John Lechneran authority on Wagner and Russian security, noted that Moscow has allowed the Wagner brand to continue to exist in Mali, partially to insure Russia against such security failures.

It is questionable how long Moscow can maintain this display of splendour – while denying that Wagner's failure can be Russia's failure, especially towards the Malian government.

Even if the Malian junta sees a take care of Wagner as a worthwhile undertaking, the mission may have to be expanded sooner or later, otherwise incidents just like the one in Tinzaouaten could turn out to be more frequent. This is especially likely if the Malian army desires to further expand the counterinsurgency mission.

Moscow definitely doesn’t wish to jeopardize its relations with the coup plotters within the Malian capital Bamako. But it’s walking a wonderful line: It doesn’t want to present the remnants of Wagner an influence that would tempt the group to act against Moscow's interests in Africa and elsewhere.

In addition, great ambitions were set for the recruitment of tens of 1000’s of Afrika Korps members Reportedly well below averagewhich limits Moscow's room for maneuver.

The incident in Tinzaouaten provides an insight into the extremely difficult security situation in Mali, but in addition shows the boundaries of clinging to the side of Russian mercenaries – whether or not they operate under the Wagner flag or have been reformed as a part of the Russian Afrika Korps.