Ukraine's cross-border incursion challenges Moscow's war narrative – but will it also change Russian opinion?

On August 6, 2024, Ukrainian soldiers crossed the border to Kursk Provincewhich marks the primary invasion of Russian territory by foreign troops since World War II. In the times following Russian TV viewers and social media users were confronted with images of burnt-out houses and captured Russian soldiers.

The attack took Russian forces by surprise they usually struggled to expel the Ukrainians from Russian territory. Over 120,000 Russian civilians have now been fled the conflict area.

This development not only calls into query Russia's military. It also calls into query the Kremlin's narrative that every little thing goes in accordance with plan, that victory for Russia is close by, and that President Vladimir Putin is able to protecting the Russian people from foreign threats.

The war between Russia and Ukraine has develop into a brutal and disheartening war of attritionEach side is struggling to lift the cash, weapons and men needed to sustain operations along a 600-mile front.

With apparently fighting in a stalematethe end result of the war might rely upon the willingness of the people of Russia and Ukraine to bear the economic costs and human sacrifices vital to proceed the war. Ukraine's invasion of Kursk could shake the Russian leadership – and the people – out of their complacency and disrupt the established order.

An overconfident Kremlin

Russian government propaganda has been strangely ambivalent throughout the war. On the one hand, state propagandists claim that Russia is in a Struggle for survival with the WestIn this heightened state of war, military spending greater than doubled to over 8% of gross domestic productand military training was introduced in all schools.

At the identical time, most Russians are being told that life can go on as usual. Moscow refuses to call its invasion a war, claiming as a substitute that it’s conducting a “special military operation.“ The Russians call it a war risk being imprisoned for spreading false information.

Likewise, unlike in Ukraine, there was no general mobilization of all young men chargeable for military service. A partial mobilization to recruit 300,000 men in September 2022 caused some public unrest.

Instead, the military relies on generous Salary of around $2,000 per 30 days and bonuses of as much as $20,000 to draw recruits from poor regions.

Assessment of public opinion

So how does the Russian public view the war?

Putin’s approval rankings, measured by the pro-government Levada Center, rose from 60% to over 80% after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 – similar to after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

However, beyond this crude “rally around the flag” effect, the Russian public has not shown much enthusiasm for the war. Since the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, polls have consistently shown that about 1 / 4 of Russians support the warAbout 15 to twenty percent are against it and the remaining majority are moderately indifferent.

Even in the event that they don’t agree with the choice to invade Ukraine, accept the federal government's representation – that the blame lies with the West and that Russia must not lose the war.

Latest Levada survey In July, the proportion of Russian respondents who want to begin negotiations with Ukraine rose to 58 percent, in comparison with 34 percent who were in favor of continuous the war without talks.

When asked in June what feelings they’d in regards to the military actions in Ukraine48 percent of respondents expressed pride in Russia, only 33 percent expressed concern and 10 percent anger. In the June survey, 65 percent blamed the West for the outbreak of war, 11 percent blamed Ukraine and only 6 percent blamed Russia.

But knowing what atypical Russians really think will not be easy. People are afraid to provide pollsters the “wrong” answer because they fear reprisals. And even before the war, pollsters' response rates in Russia were low – an issue that even highly developed democracies have. Levada reports a response rate of 25%, however the actual figure is probably going much lower.

To higher assess the mood in Russia, Public Sociology Laboratory sent young researchers to a few distant Russian regions for a month to watch the results of the war on the local population. In the small town of Cheremushkin within the Sverdlovsk Oblast, the researchers found hardly any visible traces of the war. There was a priest who spread patriotic, pro-war propaganda, but otherwise indifference prevailed.

This is consistent with the findings of journalists who seek advice from atypical Russians and monitor anonymous chat rooms on social media, equivalent to Latvia-based reporter Kristaps Adrejosons. Adrejosons has found that the prevailing mood among the many Russian public is certainly one of indifference and tolerance.

At the Russian-Ukrainian border there is a sign saying “Kursk 108 km”.
New tasks for the Ukrainian army.
AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka

Most Western media have closed their offices in Russia since it is just too dangerous for Western journalists to report on the war. But in July 2024 Francesca Ebel of the Washington Post undertook a visit to the Ural city of Kirov under the protection of local Duma deputy Maria Butina. Despite the restrictions on Ebel's reporting – official minders were at all times present – Ebel found that the war on the bottom receives only modest support, focused on volunteers helping soldiers and their families.

The role of Putinomics

The attitude of the Russian public toward the war is undoubtedly influenced by the assessment of the economic situation. The Russian government has made great efforts to take care of a way of economic stability and secure living standards.

In contrast to Predictions that Western sanctions would cause the Russian economy to collapse, GDP would grow by 3.6% in 2023 and Real incomes rose by 5.4%In fact, real wages have increased by 14 percent because the invasion and unemployment has fallen to 2.6 percent.

Russia continues to have a trade surplus from oil exports: 120 billion dollars in 2023 and 41 billion dollars in the primary half of 2024This money is now stuck in Russia and is fuelling a Consumer and real estate boom.

At the identical time, increased spending on arms purchases has boosted growth in the economic cities of Russia’s Rust Belt, as employees in arms factories spend their wages on consumer goods and services – a chief example of “Military Keynesianism.”

Most Russian recruits who sign contracts to fight in Ukraine come from the poorer regions of Russia, where their families spend their army wages – and the 90,000 USD money payments within the event of a combat death. It is estimated that Russia has 400,000 victimsTotal dead and wounded.

The Central Bank of the Russian Federation recently published a gloomy forecast for 2025, with GDP growth remaining at 1% attributable to labor shortages, lack of investment, and the increased costs related to evading Western sanctions.

But the likelihood that this economic downturn will result in unrest among the many population could be very low. Living standards should not in sight and state repression is already a powerful deterrent to organized protests.

Marching to a brand new melody

Autocratic regimes which have been ruled by harsh repression and relentless state propaganda face a dilemma relating to understanding public sentiment: they can not make sure what the general public really believes.

As a result, autocratic leaders feel vulnerable and fear that an unexpected development could trigger a mass mobilization that will reveal real, hidden mistrust. This is presumably why the Kremlin is wary of mass mobilization of conscripts while concurrently pumping money into the economy to take care of living standards.

Nevertheless, there are threats to the Kremlin. Just over a yr ago, in June 2023, the Russian state got a scare when renegade mercenaries from the Wagner Group marched on Moscow, apparently supported by many Russians within the cities they passed through. Putin face down this challenge by incorporating Wagner into the state apparatus after its leader was killed in an airplane explosion.

But now Putin faces a brand new problem: how one can keep his war narrative on target within the face of one other army on the rise – this time Ukrainian on Russian soil?

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