Seven years after the genocide, the situation of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh is worsening as a result of violence within the camps

Hundreds of hundreds of Rohingya in Bangladesh marked the seven-year anniversary of expulsion from their homes in neighboring Myanmar on August 25, 2024. It was a somber occasion for Myanmar’s long-persecuted Muslim minority, who poor living conditions and at the identical time crammed into probably the most overcrowded refugee camps on the planet.

Since 2017, their status has been constantly questioned, each by temporary Hostility from Bangladesh and an ongoing civil war in Myanmar, during which the military government proceed to crack down on the Home of the Rohingya in Rakhine State.

But recent events in Bangladesh may offer a glimmer of hope for the Rohingya. Months of political unrest led to the Overthrow of the authoritarian prime ministerSheikh Hasina, whose government failed to search out an answer to the refugee problem.

The latest interim head of presidency, Nobel Prize winner Muhammad Yunus, has agreed to defend their rights as refugees and to campaign for his or her eventual repatriation.

As Scientist who has written in regards to the Rohingya crisis and spending time within the refugee camps, I consider the percentages are still stacked against the Rohingya. Policymakers must grapple not only with the growing hostility among the many local population in Bangladesh and the continuing civil war in Myanmar, but in addition with an underestimated third factor that complicates a political solution to the crisis: persistent and growing Violence and power struggles among the many Rohingya refugees.

Murder, rape and kidnapping

More than 750,000 Rohingya fled Myanmar in August 2017 after facing brutal government crackdowns. Since then, around 235 Rohingya were killed in refugee camps in Bangladesh. In addition, the Bangladeshi authorities have registered dozens of cases of rape of Rohingya women and girls in addition to quite a few kidnappings.

The murder of outstanding figures among the many refugee population, including the 2021 Assassination of Mohib Ullaha moderate Rohingya leader, has contributed to the escalation of violence within the camp.

Such violence, combined with terrible humanitarian conditionshave led to a security vacuum within the camp, which has been filled by various armed Rohingya groups operating with different objectives and methods, but which have sparked a form of turf war involving the refugees living there.

Armed groups within the camps

From 11 known lively armed Rohingya groups – Some of them were already involved within the rebellion in Rakhine State against the central government of Myanmar before crossing the border – five of them are heavily involved within the violence within the camps.

The most famous of those is the Arakan Rohingya Salvation ArmyFounded in northern Rakhine State in 2016, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army rose to prominence after attacking Myanmar security forces in October 2016 and August 2017, sparking the federal government's crackdown on the Rohingya and their exodus.

Government troops killed an estimated 25,000 Rohingyas and compelled greater than 750,000 people out of the state in a campaign that prompted much of the international community to Call the violence genocide.

The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army’s try and gain control of the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh has led to a backlash from other groups also fighting for influence, including the Rohingya Solidarity Organization – a protracted dormant group that resurfaced in Bangladesh in 2021 with Support from Bangladeshi security authorities.

Two other groups with links to drug trafficking and other illegal activities – the formerly Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army-affiliated Master Munna Group and the Nobi Hossain Group, nominally allied with the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, have further intensified internal power struggles. Islamic Mahaj Group is attempting to recruit members within the camp with its Islamist agenda.

Human trafficking and medicines

The displacement of a whole bunch of hundreds of Rohingya refugees has given criminal groups the chance to expand their activities. Since 2017 illegal trade across the border between Myanmar and Bangladesh is flourishing, as is the arms trade from Myanmar and India, the smuggling of Yaba pills – a style of methamphetamine – and other drugs, trafficking in women and kids, and the illegal sale of humanitarian aid.

Organisations corresponding to the Master Munna and Nobi Hossain groups are involved in organised crime, extortion and smuggling within the refugee camps and are in conflict with one another for control over territory.

During my fieldwork within the camps, I observed how the refugee population can panic, especially after high-profile killings. Residents fear retaliation and further clashes between armed groups. As a result, hundreds of Rohingya have often moved from one camp to a different in the hunt for safety.

Fighting advantages Myanmar's military

In addition to the victims of this violence, the inner power struggles and criminal activities of armed Rohingya groups also exact a political price for the refugees.

Myanmar is using the fighting as a pretext in charge Bangladesh for ongoing unrest and to defend its treatment of the Rohingya as a legitimate security justification. In September 2020, Myanmar representatives accused the Bangladesh government on the United Nations General Assembly of Hosting “terrorists”, a claim that Bangladeshi diplomats strongly denied.

The violence has also promoted hostility amongst Bangladeshis towards the refugees, who’re increasingly perceived as troublemakers and criminals.

At the identical time, non-governmental organizations and aid employees are hampered of their ability to supply assistance to refugees and civilians within the camps. And an already drained Donor community sees risks to increasing militancy and crime within the camps.

Old tensions tackle latest form

Tensions between different Rohingya refugee communities are nothing latest. Before 2017, there have been already Problems between the registered registered with the UN Refugee Agency in Bangladesh and living in official camps, and people who weren’t registered and living in makeshift camps.

Yet more recently, I actually have observed open hostilities between previous generations of Rohingya refugees who fled to Bangladesh in 1978 and 1991-1992 and the brand new arrivals of the 2017 exodus. What is different now, and particularly worrying, is that after 2017, these tensions escalated into deadly violence.

The violence and killing within the camps include in my estimationabout 5,000 people. It represents a small a part of the A complete of 1.3 million Rohingya refugees – including those that fled each before and through the 2017 exodus. But the actions of this minority have caused incredible harm to the Rohingya and their future, jeopardising vital regional and global support and making eventual repatriation to Myanmar more uncertain.

The change of presidency in Bangladesh actually offers the Rohingya a possibility, especially if the brand new government keeps its guarantees, Strengthening the country’s judicial institutions And Protect minoritiesBut unrest within the camps will only exacerbate the brand new government's problems and will undermine support for an answer to the Rohingya crisis.

There are fears that this might lead to the Rohingya minority in Bangladesh having to live in unsafe and increasingly violent conditions for a lot of more years.