Israel and Iran are at war. In fact, the 2 sides have been fighting for many years, however the conflict has largely taken place under the duvet of covert and clandestine operations.
Recent actions by either side in what was once a “shadow war” have modified the character of the conflict. It just isn’t clear that de-escalation is in sight.
On October 1, 2024, Iran launched a large, Direct attack against Israel fictionally in retaliation for Israel's double murders of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah chief Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.
It was the second such barrage in six months.
From many accountsThe previous Iranian attack on Israel on April thirteenth – which consisted of over 300 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and attack drones – caused little or no damage in Israel. Maybe because of this and possibly partly because of this USA encourages restraintIsrael's immediate military response then – a airstrike against a single advanced Iranian air defense system in Isfahan province – was reasonably measured.
Many observers viewed April's calibrated exchange as a possible indication that either side would accomplish that Better to de-escalate moderately than engaging in ongoing open war.
But since then, further Israeli military operations have led to escalating Iranian military responses and pushed the conflict back out of the shadows.
With Hamas' capabilities and leadership weakened within the Gaza Strip, Israel's military leaders are deployed announced in June that this was the case “ready to face Hezbollah” – the Iran-backed Lebanese militant group whose sustained rocket attacks against northern Israel have led to sustained attacks Tens of hundreds must be evacuated the realm.
Israel turns north
Israel's pivot from Gaza toward Lebanon coincided with the assassination of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Haniyeh on July 31, 2024, while he was in Tehran. The alleged Israeli operation was described as An affront to Iran's sovereignty. It was also a humiliation This highlighted the vulnerability and permeability of Iran's internal security apparatus.
Even if Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei promised a “tough reaction” Iran had taken no motion against Israel until September.
Tehran's inaction raised questions amongst many Middle East analysts whether the Iranian response would ever materialize — and what that may mean for Khamenei's engagement together with his proxy forces more broadly.
If Iran's leadership did indeed select restraint after the assassination of Hamas' top political leader, the identical can’t be said of its response to Israel's multi-stage operation against Hezbollah in mid-September.
Israel began a secret operation to sow chaos and confusion in Hezbollah's leadership and control sabotaged explosive communications devices. Israel then carried out air strikes to eliminate it Hezbollah's top leaders including Nasrallah. The Israeli military then launched what the country's leadership called “limited [ground] Operation” into southern Lebanon to remove Hezbollah positions along the northern border.
Tehran's Oct. 1 attack in response to Israel was, in line with many Middle East experts, indeed Iranian military leadersprimarily in retaliation for the 2 high-profile assassinations against Hamas and Hezbollah leaders.
Those were actually key aspects. But as Expert on Iran's defense strategyI argue that the Iranian leadership also felt compelled to attack Israel for 3 equally, if no more, necessary reasons: to slow Israel's advance in Lebanon, to avoid wasting face, and to revive deterrence.
Challenging Israel's advance
Iran hopes to slow and even perhaps reverse Israel's successes against Hezbollah, especially as Israel begins ground operations in southern Lebanon. Of course, Israeli ground forces must now contend with perhaps probably the most capable guerrilla fighting force on the earth – one which carried out quite successfully in the course of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war.
Nonetheless, Israel's ability to realize tactical surprise and eliminate Hezbollah's top leaders – even within the midst of an ongoing, localized war and even after Israeli leaders announced its intention to attack Hezbollah – reveals a much better Israeli strategy and operational planning and execution capability than that of Hezbollah.
And that represents a serious blow to what’s seen in Iran because the crown jewel of the Islamic Republic inside its “Axis of Resistance.”
In this regard, Iran's retaliatory strike on October 1 could be seen as an try to buy time for Hezbollah appoint a substitute managerregroup and organize against Israel's ground invasion.
The brutal art of saving face?
It also serves to assist Iran save face, particularly in the best way it’s viewed by other parts of its external proxy network.
Orchestrated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Tehran's major arm for coordinating external operations – Iranian money, training, guidance and ideological support enabled and encouraged the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 – although Iran, it was claimed, had received no prior warning of the attack.
Since then, Hamas fighters have received almost no real-time support from Tehran. This lack of support undoubtedly contributed to Israel's successful downgrading of Hamas as a threat, with a lot of its members either dead or in hiding and unable to mount a coherent offensive campaign, leading Israeli military leaders to say , it was the group effectively defeated.
Not surprisingly, Iran is blissful to present the Palestinians the chance to fight Tehran's enemies and bear the human costs of the war, since this agreement primarily advantages the Islamic Republic.
When the fighting began in Gaza, the IRGC was nowhere to be found.
Wisam Hashlamoun/Anadolu via Getty Images
Now that Israel has turned its attention to Lebanon and achieved several initial tactical successes against Hezbollah, Iran cannot afford to face back and watch, for 2 major reasons. First, a 12 months of fighting in Gaza has shown that Israel is willing to do whatever is needed to eliminate threats along its borders – including a willingness to face up to international political pressure or operate inside Iran's borders.
And second, Iranian proxy groups elsewhere are watching to see whether Tehran will proceed to support them—or abandon them, as appears to have happened with Hamas.
Regain deterrence
Perhaps foremost in Tehran's calculations about how one can respond is the necessity to restore deterrence.
The two defining features of Iran's interconnected foreign relations or “Forward defense“and deterrence strategies is its regional network of militant proxies and its Arsenal of long-range weaponswhich incorporates a lot of advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and attack-capable drones.
These Iranian defense strategies aim to discourage enemies from attacking Iran proper in two ways: first, by threatening Israel and other regional U.S. allies with punishment through proxy militias or attacks with long-range weapons; and second, by offering scapegoats against whom Iran's enemies can express their anger. In effect, Iran's proxy forces act as proxy targets that bear the prices of Iran's hostile policies.
Israel's denigration of Hamas and ongoing operations against Hezbollah threaten to undermine Iran's ability to discourage attacks on its homeland. This is an unacceptable risk for the leadership of the Islamic Republic.
Who will make the subsequent move?
These intertwined needs likely led the Iranian leadership to launch a second massive, direct missile strike against Israel on October 1. It is unknown how effective the attack might be in achieving Tehran's goals.
The Islamic Republic claimed that so many 90% of ballistic missiles reached their intended targetswhile Israel and the United States described the attack as “defeated and ineffective,” despite Unverified cellular phone videos It shows several ballistic missiles exploding after reaching land in Israel.
What is nearly certain, nevertheless, is that this can not be the ultimate step within the conflict. It is unlikely that Israel will end its Lebanon operation until it achieves its border security objectives. And Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did promised retribution against Iran for its recent retaliatory attack.
IRGC leaders responded to this warning with one own counter threat that if Israel responds militarily to the October 1 attack, Iran will respond again with unspecified “devastating and destructive attacks.”
Neither side gives in rhetorically; This may additionally apply militarily. The nature and extent of Israel's next move will determine how the war with Iran unfolds – but make no mistake, it’s a war.
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