There was a time when the difficulty of nuclear weapons was so crucial to international peace that it could bring even essentially the most bitter opponents right into a room. There is a growing sense that that point is over.
On July 17, China announced it might suspend arms control talks with Washington, a move prone to cause further excitement within the Pentagon as Beijing is predicted to extend its nuclear arsenal to over 1,000 warheads by 2030. Arms control talks between the US and Russia are further away than ever, with Russian politicians threatening to deploy more nuclear missiles closer to NATO territory in retaliation for the longer term deployment of US long-range missiles in Germany.
Meanwhile, President Joe Biden's administration has adopted latest nuclear policy guidelines to make sure Washington is healthier prepared to deal concurrently with its nuclear adversaries Russia, China and North Korea.
The US attempts to stigmatise China and Russia and get them to resume arms control talks are pure theatre. The deployment of more medium-range missile systems in Europe or Asia will likely force China and Russia to place much more resources into their very own strategic weapons systems.
This isn’t the primary time Washington and Moscow have passed through such a situation. During the four-decade Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were involved in several nuclear standoffs—the competing nuclear tests of the Fifties, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and the euro crisis of the early Nineteen Eighties, to call a number of. Yet at critical moments, each knew when to step back from the brink, if only because the choice—arms race and potential disaster—was too terrible to assume. John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev concluded the Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972. And in 1987, after years of intense negotiations, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.
A bit nuclear pressure
The difference between then and now, nevertheless, is striking. During the Cold War, the nuclear superpowers were willing to maintain nuclear armament issues separate, whilst other conflicts—the division of Europe, Soviet pressure on Poland, and the wars in Angola, Afghanistan, and Central America—created a systemic rivalry between the 2 powers.
Today, there isn’t a longer any isolation. Instead, Russia and China are using their nuclear weapons programs to extract concessions from the USA on other issues. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has repeatedly ruled out a resumption of nuclear talks between the USA and Russia, as Washington continues to support Ukraine militarily. China also stresses that nuclear talks with Washington cannot proceed unless the USA stops its arms exports to Taiwan.
The Biden administration is frustrated by this connection. But it shouldn’t be surprised. Nuclear weapons will not be only a matter of prestige for Moscow and Beijing, but in addition a way of pressure to get the US to comply with their demands. While some could also be willing to stop arms sales to Ukraine, relating to Taiwan, this can be a lost cause in US policy circles. If the value of arms control negotiations with Russia or China is a fundamental reorientation of US foreign policy, Washington is prone to avoid dialogue.
Can the United States do something to maintain the door open to dialogue? Yes, but it would require some difficult decisions from Washington.
First, the United States could reverse its decision to station U.S. long-range missiles in Germany by 2026. This reversal is less radical than it could seem. While stationing more missiles in Central Europe will give NATO allies more certainty about U.S. intentions, it would not significantly strengthen NATO's deterrence against Russia. NATO has been deterring Russia for many years and has good enough military capability to defend its member states even without these latest missile sites.
Make compromises
Additional assurances from Washington are also unnecessary. NATO's Article 5 mutual assistance clause has proven remarkably successful. Although Russia has launched a war in Ukraine, it avoids actions – corresponding to attacks on NATO arms convoys in Ukraine – that could possibly be interpreted as an armed attack on the alliance.
The concept that Russia would tackle NATO while the world is exposing its poor military performance in Ukraine is tough to imagine. In fact, a stronger US security policy in Germany could even be counterproductive, as it might discourage European states from investing in their very own defense capabilities in the long run. Stopping the missile deployments can be an indication to Russia that the United States is no less than willing to do its part to create a positive climate for talks without jeopardizing NATO's power.
Still, it costs Biden nothing to elucidate on to Xi that the core tenets of U.S. policy toward Taiwan—opposition to Taiwan independence, support for a peaceful resolution of cross-strait disputes, and opposition to unilateral changes to the establishment—are the identical today as they were when the United States normalized diplomatic relations with China in 1979. The United States could even go a step further by formally condemning “strategic clarity” as a U.S. policy option. This would reassure Taiwan that a proper U.S. defense guarantee is imminent and reduce China’s concerns about U.S. intentions.
The famous quote from Reagan and Gorbachev that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” remains to be relevant today. Strategic stability with the world's major powers remains to be possible, even when it requires compromises along the best way.
Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune. ©2024 Chicago Tribune. Distributed by Tribune Content Agency.
image credit : www.mercurynews.com