Iran’s intervention within the Sudanese civil war serves its geopolitical goals – but shouldn’t be without risks

Iran’s role in funding and arming proxy groups within the Middle East is well documented and has received additional attention because the Hamas-led attack in Israel in October 2023. Likewise, Tehran’s Arms deliveries to Russia are well-known and have led to complaints and sanctions from the West.

Tehran's military intervention in one other deadly conflict, the Sudanese civil war, has received little coverage.

Since the conflict began in April 2023, he has killed at the least 13,000 people, injured over 33,000 more and offset Millions more. After years of relative peace, persons are massacred once more within the southern region of Darfur.

Immediately after the outbreak of fighting between two rival factions of the Sudanese military government, Iran limited itself to supplying humanitarian aid.

But this policy didn’t last long. Between December 2023 and January 2024 Tehran delivered several Mohajer-6 medium-range reconnaissance and attack drones to President Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

In February the drones helped the SAF, The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have launched an offensive in town of Omdurman.

Although the conflict in Sudan attracts less global attention than the conflicts in Ukraine and the Gaza Strip, it’s of strategic importance for Tehran. Expert on Iranian foreign policyI see how Tehran is increasingly using its engagement in African conflict zones to advance the country's military, industrial and particularly geopolitical goals. It follows an identical development to Iran's engagement in Ethiopia throughout the Tigray War 2020–22.

Radiate power

Militarily and commercially, drone exports to the SAF are a continuation of Iranian actions since Expiry of a UN arms embargo against Tehran in October 2020.

Since then, Iran has been supplying surveillance and attack drones not only to its quasi- and non-state proxies and partners within the Middle East – corresponding to Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis in Yemen – but increasingly also to states outside the region. like Ethiopia, Russia, Tajikistan And Venezuela.

Iran has done this to exhibit power, strengthen alliances and influence conflicts within the Middle East and other regions. At the identical time, it may prove to be a lucrative income for the Iranian economy and a showcase for the country's technology. While it’s difficult to find out the precise revenue Iran has earned from exporting military drones, the estimated value The global market value was $12.55 billion in 2022, and is anticipated to succeed in $14.14 billion in 2023 and $35.60 billion in 2030.

As for Sudan, arming the SAF serves each Iran's broader geopolitical goals and its competition with regional rivals, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel.

Rogue states

Relations between Iran and Sudan date back to 1989, when Tehran supported the coup led by Omar al-Bashir, who later became President of Sudan. In the Nineteen Nineties and 2000s offered development aid and military aid to Sudan. The country exported tractors there and stationed warships in Sudanese ports within the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

Through these strategic routes and shipping lanes, Tehran exported oil to African countries and smuggled weapons to regional customers, including the Houthi rebels in Yemen and Palestinian militants within the Gaza Strip.

As a so-called Rogue state Although Sudan was subject to US sanctions and embargoes, it provided diplomatic support to Tehran throughout.

It recognized Iran's right to pursue a nuclear program and voted against UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Tehran's human rights record. From 1979 to 2021, Sudan was is the third largest Iran trading partner in Africa, accounting for 3% of its average annual trade with the continent.

But between 2013 and 2016, Iranian-Sudanese relations suffered a series of great setbacks. In 2014 Iran's cultural center closed and expelled its diplomatic representatives for allegedly propagating Shiism in a predominantly Sunni country. Two years later, in 2016, it and other countries within the Horn of Africa were cut formal ties with Tehran.

These setbacks resulted from Iran Withdrawal from Sudan and Africa to give attention to nuclear diplomacy with the United States and other world powers. also coincided with growing military, diplomatic and economic support from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to Sudan and other states within the Horn of Africa in exchange for joining the Saudi-led coalition against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen.

This assistance was particularly tempting for Sudan, which was facing isolation and economic difficulties because of the establishment of an International Criminal Court. Arrest warrant against al-BashirThe Secession of oil-rich South Sudan and the imposition of tougher sanctions by the USA

Although Iran and Sudan later Participation in multilateral meetings With regard to agricultural cooperation, bilateral relations between the countries have never fully recovered.

Progress on the Horn

The civil war offers Iran a possibility to correct its course towards Sudan. Supporting the SAF may help Tehran save relations with Sudan while curbing Saudi and Emirati influence within the country and across the continent.

Tehran seeks to assist al-Burhan and the SAF win the war and regain control of the state.

The SAF's support also suits right into a dynamic that existed before the war and is in turn linked to Iran's struggle for influence with Saudi Arabia. In 2019, Hemedti served alongside al-Burhan on the transitional military council after al-Bashir was ousted in a coup. visited Saudi Arabia and promised her support within the fight against Iran and the Houthis.

Nevertheless, the SAF’s support for Iran shouldn’t be without risks.

First of all, a victory for al-Burhan and the SAF is much from certain. Since October 2023, the RSF has captured some key statesincluding the capital Khartoum and the granary Gezira. In February 2024, the SAF will launched an offensive in Omdurman and made profits there. Nevertheless, the general balance could still be in RSF's favor.

And unlike within the wars in Syria and Ukraine, in Sudan Tehran finds itself within the awkward position of supporting an opponent of Russia that sponsors the RSF.

And unlike within the Ethiopia conflict, during which Iran supported the federal government against rebel groups alongside Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, Tehran and Abu Dhabi are competing for influence in Sudan. through the support of the SAF and RSFOutside the military sphere, the UAE has a substantial economic advantage ahead of Iran as Sudan’s largest export partner and second largest import partner.

Fueling conflicts

Even if al-Burhan were to emerge victorious, it shouldn’t be a on condition that Iran's position in Sudan would improve significantly or that its influence would grow.

Iran is restricted by its position as a Shiite power; Sudan is a Sunni-majority country. And even before Sudan broke off relations with Iran and descended into one other civil war, had long accepted agricultural, industrial, development and military support from Iran's regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Israel.

After Khartoum joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, normalized relationships with Tel Aviv through the Abraham Accords in return for diplomatic and economic incentives from the United States

Time will tell whether Iran's military intervention in Sudan represents a turning point in bilateral relations or is merely an arms transfer in yet one more civil war fuelled by foreign intervention.